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UPDATES FROM THE international CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
International Criminal Court
ICC Prosecutor Declines To Pursue
DRC Allegations In Bemba Case
In June 2010, Congolese victims who
claimed to have suffered crimes at the
hands of the Movement for the Liberation
of Congo (MLC) asked the Pre-Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to review the Prosecutor’s
decision not yet to prosecute Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo for crimes allegedly committed in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). Bemba is the former vice
president of Congo and leader of the
MLC, a group that controlled a large part
of northeastern and northwestern Congo
from 1998 to 2003. The Prosecutor charged
Bemba with two counts of crimes against
humanity and three counts of war crimes
for his alleged role in rape, murder, and
pillaging committed during the 2002-2003
coup d’etat in the Central African Republic
(CAR). The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
and Human Rights Watch have also implicated Bemba’s MLC in several crimes
against civilians in northern Congo, stemming from a military operation initiated
by the group in 2002. The OTP will try to
prove that Bemba had command over the
MLC troops in the CAR, but has yet to
indicate any intention of prosecuting the
crimes allegedly committed in the DRC.
On October 25, Pre-Trial Chamber I
declined the Congolese victims’ request.
Victims’ rights in this capacity are addressed
by Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute of
the ICC, which allows victims to make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Pre-Trial Chamber I explained that the
Prosecutor has not yet made a formal decision not to investigate the alleged crimes
in the DRC. In response, human rights
organizations have noted that no action
has been taken despite the Prosecutor’s
use of the MLC’s modus operandi in the
DRC to demonstrate that Bemba should
have known MLC troops were likely to
commit crimes in the CAR. Because the
Prosecution is using the MLC’s modus
operandi as part of its case in the crimes
allegedly committed in the CAR, these

groups believe that the Prosecutor has evidence and information about how the MLC
functioned in the DRC.
Mariana Pena, the permanent representative to the ICC of the International
Federation for Human Rights, contends
that the lack of a decision to prosecute
Bemba thus far for crimes committed in
the DRC is telling:
The Prosecutor has not said formally he isn’t going to prosecute
Bemba [over these allegations],
but his trial is starting and there
have been no attempts over the
last two or three years to charge
him with crimes in DRC, so you
read from the context there is no
intention to prosecute.
Although an ICC spokesman has said
that further legal action is not ruled out,
the Prosecutor has already elected to delay
prosecution regarding the alleged crimes
in the DRC. Even if further legal action is
planned, the Prosecutor could potentially
miss his window to prosecute Bemba for
his alleged crimes in the DRC. Article
67(c) of the Rome Statute of the ICC
provides that among the rights of the
accused is the right “[t]o be tried without
undue delay.” If a separate trial were to be
brought against Bemba in the future, his
defense could potentially argue that this
right has been violated by the Prosecutor’s
failure to act in the interest of efficiency
by excluding these charges in the first trial.
By comparison, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda has “considered that
an inexcusable delay attributable to the
Prosecutor . . . entitles the accused to have
the charges dropped ‘with prejudice’ to the
Prosecutor . . . .” In a specific instance, the
Human Rights Committee considered that
Canada violated the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights’ provision
(upon which the Rome Statue’s is modeled)
for trial without undue delay when the
preparation for an appeal hearing resulted
in a three-year delay.
Bemba’s defense could also look to
Article 60(4) to argue that the Pre-Trial
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Chamber in a future case is obligated to
release Bemba. Article 60(4) provides:
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure
that a person is not detained for an
unreasonable period prior to trial
due to inexcusable delay by the
Prosecutor. If such delay occurs,
the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or without
conditions.
The success of these potential arguments hinges upon the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
interpretation of the statute. However, the
Prosecutor’s decision not to include all
possible charges against Bemba in the first
complaint could unnecessarily provide an
opportunity for Bemba to escape facing
further charges. It is possible that the evidence used to establish the aforementioned
modus operandi does not provide a sufficient basis for filing additional charges.
Nevertheless, reluctance to file charges
with regard to Bemba’s alleged crimes in
the DRC calls into question the thoroughness and completeness of the OTP’s current
case.

Prosecutor Threatens ICC
Involvement in Ivory Coast
On December 21, 2010, International
Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo issued a statement on the
situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast).
Ivory Coast is now steeped in violence
following incumbent president Laurent
Gbagbo’s refusal to hand over his office to
Alassane Outtara, winner of November’s
presidential elections. The situation has
not escaped the attention of the United
Nations, and was highlighted in a report
from Kyung-wha Kang, the UN deputy
high commissioner for human rights to a
special session of the UN Human Rights
council in Geneva. “Between December
16 and December 21, human rights officers have substantiated allegations of 173
killings, 90 instances of torture and ill
treatment, 471 arrests and detentions, and
24 cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances,” reported Kang.
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In making this statement, the Prosecutor
has made a political statement by exerting
pressure with the threat of possible ICC
intervention. Ocampo promised that he
would open an investigation should any
“serious crimes” under the jurisdiction
of the ICC be committed. The Prosecutor
specifically mentioned Charles Blé Goudé,
a youth leader who has used incendiary language during daily-televised rallies,
warning him of the possible consequences.
Ocampo also warned that the UN would
respond if its peacekeepers or forces were
attacked, which has been a concern.
Ocampo continued by suggesting that
African states can find a solution to the
problem. But, failing that, “African states
could be willing to refer the case to my
Office and also provide forces to arrest
those individuals who commit the crimes in
Côte d’Ivoire.” This last statement appears
to be encouraging domestic institutions to
handle the situation. This goal falls under
the prerogative of complementarity, a principle based on the idea that the ICC is a
“court of last resort,” and will only initiate
proceedings where domestic jurisdictions
are unwilling or unable to investigate and
prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of
the court.
This action speaks to the role of politics and persuasion within the Prosecutor’s
work. While it appears that the Prosecutor’s
statement is attempting to advance the call
for complementarity and prevent crimes
from being committed, states may question
whether his chosen method in this instance
was an appropriate one. In attempting to
force Ivory Coast’s hand in this matter,
the OTP is exerting a measure of political
pressure. Given that Ivory Coast is not a
party to the Rome Statute, the prosecutor
would be required to open a case in this
situation via ad hoc submission pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute
or Security Council referral, outlined in
Article 13(b). The Prosecutor could contend that the ultimate goals, encouraging
the intervention of domestic institutions
and prevention of further violence, are
within his authority. The Prosecutor made
no mention of whether the Ivory Coast is
“unwilling and unable” to handle the matter domestically, a requirement set forth by
the Rome Statute, making the discussion
of an investigation potentially premature.
This, combined with statements promising prosecutions prior to the initiation of

formal investigations, could lead States
Parties to the Rome Statute to question
whether the Prosecutor is overstepping his
boundaries.
Another concern is whether the
Prosecutor’s actions could be used against
him in court should the OTP proceed
with an investigation and eventual prosecution. Potentially, the accused could argue
that the Prosecutor has taken a prejudicial stance regarding guilt prior to the
investigation. Given all of the existing
political pressure on Ivory Coast, it is
debatable whether potentially circumventing the rules and procedures of the ICC in
exchange for additional political pressure
advances the ICC’s cause. Additionally,
in future instances, if the Prosecutor were
to act in a similarly preemptive capacity, it is unclear how States Parties to the
Rome Statute would react. Perhaps it will
engender further complementarity, but it is
conceivable that this will be another point
of criticism for states such as Kenya, which
has recently been reluctant to cooperate
with the Court, to further question the
ICC’s authority.
On January 25, 2011, the Prosecutor
announced that he began collecting information about the alleged violations in
Ivory Coast. “The judges have to be sure,
my job now is to define if we have to intervene or not?” he stated, adding that his
“job is not political.” The OTP has taken a
position to work towards complementarity
and to discourage potential violence—both
of which are primary goals of the ICC. But
the means by which the OTP has acted to
achieve these ends are political ones, leaving it vulnerable to further criticism and a
continued lack of cooperation from various
States.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.

International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
ICTR Permits Disclosure of
Confidential Witness Testimony to
France
On September 16, 2010, the
International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) ruled to vary witness protective measures in Nzabonimana, allowing the disclosure of confidential wit45

ness information to assist France in its
investigation and domestic prosecution of
international crimes committed in Rwanda
in 1994. The tribunal relied on its decision
in Nyiramasuhuko et al, in which protected
testimony was disclosed to Danish authorities on the basis that the principle of state
cooperation articulated in Article 28 of
the ICTR statute also applies to requests
from states to the tribunal. Although the
decision in Nzabonimana is not entirely
unique, it indicates that the ICTR’s liberal
approach to granting protective measures
may extend beyond the life of the tribunal,
particularly in relation to the domestic
prosecution of international crimes.
The ICTR stated in the Nzabonimana
decision that it does not grant witness
protective measures based solely on a
witness’s subjective fear of testifying, but
also considers an objective standard when
determining whether the witness’s security
it threatened. Despite this intention, the
ICTR has been criticized for its zealous
approach to granting protective measures.
Professor Göran Sluiter suggests that protective measures have been granted as an
automatic right rather than a provision for
exceptional circumstances in which a witness’s security is threatened, which may be
inconsistent with the principle of transparent trials.
Rule 75(F) of the ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence provides that witness protective measures are effective until
altered by the tribunal. To alter or remove
protective measures, the tribunal has held
in practice that the party seeking variation must demonstrate that the protected
witness gave his or her clear consent to
the variation, or that the situation that initially justified the protective measures has
changed. In Nzabonimana, the Prosecutor
submitted an affidavit from the witness
giving his full consent to the disclosure of
materials to French authorities. However,
if the witness does not consent to the variance of protective measures, the tribunal
has considerable discretion in determining
whether to amend the measures.
The ICTR anticipates that amending
witness protective orders will remain an
issue following the completion of proceedings. Therefore, in light of the many
orders issued, the tribunal suggested a limited review of witness protection orders it
expects will require alteration, rather than
a comprehensive review of all protection
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orders. The Office of Legal Counsel is
considering the most effective manner to
conduct such a review.
Whatever the tribunal’s ultimate
approach, its policy could significantly
affect witness security and international
criminal justice, particularly if the tribunal varies or rescinds protective measures without the witness’s consent. If the
ICTR decides whether or not to vary or
rescind protective measures in advance of
a request, it risks not accounting for future,
unknown circumstances that could threaten
the security of a witness. Consideration
of possible threats to a witness’s security
becomes more complicated as non-parties,
such as France, seek access to testimony
for national prosecution of international
crimes.
The ICTR must balance the challenge
of amending a large number of witness
protective measures without knowledge of
future circumstances that could threaten
witnesses’ security with the need for tribunal documents to be publicly available to
promote state cooperation with the ICTR.
As states, such as France, prosecute international crimes in domestic courts, documents from international tribunals could
be invaluable resources to fair and efficient
proceedings. Although the ICTR has liberally granted witness protective measures, it
must nevertheless prioritize witness security as it seeks to efficiently review a large
number of orders.

Security Council Votes to Establish
ICTR Residual Mechanism
On December 22, 2010, the Security
Council voted on S/RES/1966 (2010)
(Resolution 1966) to establish the
International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism). As the
international community has anticipated
the end of tribunal proceedings, informal
working groups sought to determine the
best way to address residual issues. The
groups debated topics including: whether
the necessary residual functions required
semi-permanent institutions or ad hoc
responses, whether one mechanism should
be established for all international criminal
tribunals or if each tribunal should have
its own mechanism, and the extent to
which cost and efficiency should influence
the options. Resolution 1966 establishes
separate Mechanisms for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
Mechanism for the ICTR will continue the
“jurisdiction, rights and obligations, and
essential functions” of the ICTR beginning
July 1, 2012.
State cooperation with the Mechanism
will be necessary to ensure that it remains a
“small, temporary and efficient structure”
with its operations reducing over time, and
does not develop into a complex replacement institution. The ICTR’s December
2010 Completion Strategy Report highlighted many issues that will be of concern
to the Mechanism and cooperating states,
such as prosecution of remaining fugitives
and relocation of individuals acquitted or
convicted by the ICTR or the Mechanism.
The ICTR has not yet prosecuted ten
indicted fugitives that remain in neighboring countries. The ICTR particularly seeks
cooperation from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, where most of the fugitives remain, and Kenya, where Félicien
Kabuga, accused of financing the 1994
genocide, allegedly lives. While the ICTR
has attempted to work with national police
to arrest the fugitives, the Mechanism will
likely inherit the responsibility of prosecuting them upon arrest. Article 1 of the
Mechanism’s Transitional Arrangements
states that the Mechanism “shall have
competence over” a fugitive arrested after
July 1, 2012. However, according to Article
6 of the Statute of the Mechanisms, the
Mechanism must make every effort to refer
cases to national courts, after considering
the gravity of crimes charged and the likelihood that the accused will receive a fair
trial. After the Mechanism refers a case to
national courts, it must assist the state upon
request in the investigation, prosecution
and trial of an accused, and monitor the
case’s progress.
Additionally, the Mechanism will
require state cooperation in relocating individuals who were acquitted or who have
served their sentences, but who have not
been resettled and remain in safe houses in
Arusha. In his speech to the UN Security
Council, President of the ICTR Judge
Byron explained that some of these individuals are in a “legal vacuum,” and many
others will be in similar situations in the
future as they complete their sentences.
The Mechanism will assume responsibility for ensuring that these persons are
relocated, a task necessary to ensure the
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“interests of justice and the rule of law,”
but impossible without state cooperation.
Resolution 1966 passed by a vote of
fourteen to none, with Russia abstaining
because it believed that the ad hoc tribunals
had sufficient time to complete their operations in accordance with the Completion
Strategies. Regardless of whether the ICTR
completes its operations by the projected
date, there will undoubtedly be residual
issues that must be addressed to avoid
undermining the breakthrough achievements of the ad hoc tribunals. Just as state
cooperation is required to promptly fulfill
the ICTR Completion Strategy, the subsequent Mechanism will also require state
cooperation to ensure its responsibilities
gradually diminish, ultimately resulting in
the accomplishment of the ICTR mandate.

Defense in Ngirabatware Moves to
Disqualify Trial Chamber II’s Judges
On January 5, 2011, Augustin
Ngirabatware’s defense counsel at
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) submitted a motion to
disqualify Trial Chamber II’s judges pursuant to rule 15(b) of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. Rule 15 allows a judge to
be disqualified from any case in which she
has any association that might affect her
impartiality. In Rutaganda, the ICTR held
that judges are presumed to be impartial.
In Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, the
ICTR applied principles articulated by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber
to interpret the impartiality requirement.
Specifically, an unacceptable appearance
of bias exists if a judge is a party to a case,
has a direct interest in the outcome of a
case, or if a reasonable observer, someone
informed of all the relevant circumstances,
including the traditions of integrity and
impartiality of judges, and who understand
that judges swear to uphold the duty of
being impartial, would apprehend bias.
The defense in Ngirabatware stated that
the judges have shown “such a deep-seated
antagonism against the Defence” that a
fair trial is “compromised and impossible.” The motion alleges judicial interference during the trial proceedings in favor
of the prosecution, such as cutting short
defense counsel’s attempts to elicit contradictory evidence from a witness, denial of
adequate time for the defense to prepare,
undue delay in the Trial Chambers’ deliv-
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ery of decisions, and inconsistency in decisions. The defense concludes, “[w]hen the
Trial Chamber always favors the same side,
it creates an appearance of partiality to any
impartial observer.”
The defendants in the RUF case in the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
moved for the disqualification of Judge
Bankole Thompson based on the appearance of bias. Judge Thompson had previously written a book in which he stated
that the armed organization of which the
defendants were members was guilty of
human rights violations. Although Judge
Thompson believed he could impartially
adjudicate the case, his colleagues recused
him because a reasonable bystander would
likely perceive bias after reading the book.
By comparison, Ngirabatware’s motion for
disqualification of judges is not based
on the appearance of bias from external factors. Instead, the motion is based
on internal trial activities and decisions.
Additionally, in the SCSL case the defense
sought to disqualify one individual judge,
rather than an entire panel of judges as in
Ngirabatware.
Theodor Meron, a judge in the ICTY and
ICTR Appeals Chambers, claims that the
structure of international tribunals, which
includes a panel of judges that engage in
discussion before rendering a judgment,
ensures that any individual judge’s latent
bias does not influence the outcome of a
case. Meron acknowledged that tribunals
should not be immune from criticism, but
argued that criticism motivated solely by
dislike for the results of a case may be
“unfounded and excessive.” Ngirbatware’s
motion sets out over 200 pages of criticism directed at all of the judges assigned
to the case, and was introduced late in the
proceedings. While the ICTR must fairly
evaluate all evidence to ensure that judgment in Ngirbatware is not characterized
by systematic bias, it should not disqualify
judges based on the defense’s dissatisfaction with the progress of the case. If the
ICTR orders the dismissal of an entire trial
chamber, the legitimacy of the tribunal’s
previous rulings could be compromised.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for
the Human Rights Brief.

Judgment Summaries: International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Calixte Kalimanzira v. The
Prosecutor, Appeals Judgment,
Case No. ICTR-05-88-A
On October 20, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
judgment in the case against Callixte
Kalimanzira, directeur de cabinet in
the Rwandan Ministry of Interior. Trial
Chamber III had previously found
Kalimanzira guilty of aiding and abetting
genocide, instigating genocide, and direct
and public incitement to commit genocide,
sentencing him to thirty years imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber accepted six
of Kalimanzira’s nine grounds of appeal
and reduced his sentence to twenty-five
years imprisonment.
Among Kalimanzira’s successful
grounds of appeal was a challenge to the
Trial Chamber’s finding that he had aided
and abetted genocide through his presence
at the inauguration of Elie Ndayambaje as
bougmestre of Muganza Commune, during
which Ndayambaje allegedly instigated
the killing of Tutsis with genocidal intent.
As an initial matter, the Appeals Chamber
held that, in view of Kalimanzira’s position as directeur de cabinet of the Ministry
of Interior, his silent presence during
Ndayambaje’s inflammatory inaugural
speech could reasonably have been interpreted as tacit approval of the message.
Before turning to whether this silent presence substantially contributed to the killings for purposes of supporting the aiding and abetting conviction, however, the
Appeals Chamber, with Judge Pocar dissenting, determined that there was insufficient evidence that Tutsis were, in fact,
killed as a result of Ndayambaje’s speech.
Judge Pocar disagreed with the majority
that Kalimanzira had demonstrated that no
reasonable finder of fact could have determined that acts of genocide occurred as a
result of Ndayambaje’s inaugural address.
The Appeals Chamber also reversed
Kalimanzira’s conviction for instigating
and aiding and abetting genocide in relation to killings at the Butare-Gisagara roadblock, based on a finding that Kalimanzira
had received insufficient notice of this
crime to prepare a defense. The Defense
had first objected to the lack of notice
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regarding Kalimanzira’s alleged crimes at
the Butare-Gisagara roadblock during trial,
but the Trial Chamber held that although
the indictment was vague, it was satisfied
that this defect had been cured through
the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief and the
Prosecution’s opening statement. The
Appeals Chamber disagreed, noting the
inaccurate description of the roadblock’s
location in the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief,
the short time-period between the filing
of the French translation of the pre-trial
brief, and the leading of evidence regarding this incident, and the Prosecution’s
statement that the pre-trial brief contained
no new allegations. While recognizing
that the Prosecution’s opening statement
clearly referred to allegations at the ButareGisagara roadblock, the Appeals Chamber
held that the opening statement alone was
insufficient to cure the defect.
Another successful ground of appeal
from the Defense related to Kalimanzira’s
convictions by the Trial Chamber for direct
and public incitement to genocide at the
Jaguar and Kajyanama roadblocks. The Trial
Chamber had based the Jaguar roadblock
conviction on its finding that Kalimanzira
appeared at the roadblock on a particular day,
handed a rifle to a man standing at the roadblock, and told a group of “several others”
that the “gun was to be used to kill Tutsis.”
With regard to the Kajyanama roadblock,
the Trial Chamber found that Kalimanzira
had exhorted the people manning the roadblock to carry arms to “defend themselves
against ‘the enemy’” and that he “was understood to be calling for the killing of Tutsis.”
In addition, the Trial Chamber noted that
Kalimanzira had “underscored” this call by
slapping a person who was not carrying a
weapon and removing that person from the
roadblock. Reviewing these findings, the
Appeals Chamber first recalled an earlier
holding that “supervising a specific group of
individuals managing a roadblock does not
constitute public incitement to commit genocide” and noted that all previous convictions
before the ICTR for direct and public incitement to genocide involved “speeches made
to large, fully public assemblies, messages
disseminated by the media, and communications made through a public address system
of a broad public area.” In addition, noting
that the ICTR Statute’s language regarding the crime of genocide tracks that of the
Genocide Convention, the Appeals Chamber
stressed that the travaux préparatoires of the
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Genocide Convention “confirms that public incitement to genocide pertains to mass
communications.” Indeed, the drafters of
the Genocide Convention, according to the
Appeals Chamber, expressly removed “private incitement,” understood as “more subtle
forms of communication such as conversations, private meetings, or messages,” from
the scope of the definition of genocide.
Turning to the facts before it, the
Appeals Chamber determined that
Kalimanzira’s instructions were intended
only for those manning the roadblocks and
not the general public, and thus it reversed
his convictions for direct and public incitement to genocide. Judge Pocar delivered a
separate opinion on this subject, making
clear that while he agreed with the decision
to overturn the convictions, he viewed the
Appeals Chamber’s emphasis on the size
of the audience being incited as setting a
dangerous precedent as to what minimum
audience size is required to establish direct
and public incitement to genocide. Instead,
Judge Pocar drew on the ICTR jurisprudence from the Akayesu and Kajelijeli
cases and argued that the Appeals Chamber
should have considered the circumstances
of the incitement, including where the
incitement occurred and whether or not the
audience was select or limited.
A further conviction for direct and
public incitement to commit genocide,
based on a speech Kalimanzira allegedly
gave at the Nyabisagara football field
in Kibayi Commune, was reversed based
on a finding that the Trial Chamber had
relied exclusively on uncorroborated evidence of a single Prosecution witness and
failed to adequately address conflicting
evidence presented by five Defense witnesses. On similar grounds, the Appeals
Chamber reversed Kalimanzira’s conviction for direct and public incitement to
genocide regarding events at the Gisagara
Marketplace. The Trial Chamber had relied
on a single witness’s uncorroborated statement that Kalimanzira had criticized members of the crowd for being unarmed, and
instructed them to kill young Tutsi girls.
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber failed to provide a clear explanation for accepting the witness’s uncorroborated identification of Kalimanzira.
Kalimanzira also appealed his conviction for aiding and abetting genocide in
relation to the massacre at Kabuye hill in
April 1994, which was described by the

Trial Chamber as an “enormous human
tragedy.” Kalimanzira argued that there
was insufficient evidence of his substantial contribution to acts of genocide. The
Appeals Chamber noted evidence from
survivors of the massacre that Kalimanzira
had instructed Tutsis at the Gisagara marketplace to seek refuge at Kabuye hill,
promising safety. Kalimanzira, along with
armed soldiers and policemen, had then
gone to the hill, and used their firearms to
massacre the Tutsis. The Appeals Chamber
held that it was reasonable to find that
Kalimanzira had provided substantial assistance to the massacre, even if that assistance was unknown to the principal perpetrators of the massacre. The remaining
appeal grounds that were rejected by the
Appeals Chamber included Kalimanzira’s
submissions that his authority and alibi
were inappropriately assessed and a sentencing appeal by the Prosecution, which
argued that the gravity of the crimes committed necessitated imprisonment for the
remainder of Kalimanzira’s life.
While almost all of Kalimanzira’s convictions were reversed, the Appeals Chamber
characterized Kalimanzira’s remaining conviction of aiding and abetting the genocide
of Tutsis at Kabuye hill as “an extremely
serious crime.” The Appeals Chamber
accordingly sentenced Kalimanzira to
twenty-five years imprisonment.
John Coleman, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Sam Szoke-Burke, Consultant for the War Crimes
Research Office, edited this summary for the
Human Rights Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Yussuf
Munyakazi, Trial Judgment, Case
No. ICTR-97-36A-T
On July 5, 2010, Trial Chamber I of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) sentenced Yussuf Munyakazi, who
has been in prison since 2004, to a twentyfive year term for his participation in and
leadership of the Bugarama Interahamwe during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Trial
Chamber determined that Munyakazi, a wellknown local businessman and rice farmer in
Bugarama commune, served as a de facto
leader of the Interahamwe in planning and
executing two attacks on Tutsi refugees.
Munyakazi was initially indicted by
the Pre-Trial Chamber on three counts:
48

genocide, complicity in genocide, and
extermination as a crime against humanity.
Ultimately, he was found guilty of genocide and extermination as a crime against
humanity and not guilty of complicity in
genocide, specifically because complicity
was charged in the alternative to genocide.
The convictions were based on two attacks
Munyakazi led on Shangi and Mibilizi
parishes between April 29 and 30, 1994,
which resulted in the deaths of approximately 5,000 Tutsi. Munyakazi offered two
alibis to counter the charges that he participated in the attacks, but the Chamber found
neither to be credible. In both instances, the
defense failed to present any alibi until just
before trial. Additionally, the defense did
not provide any witnesses to corroborate
Munyakazi’s version of events, which was
inconsistent throughout the pretrial examination process.
Although the Prosecution was unable to
show evidence that the accused personally
killed Tutsi civilians, the Chamber nevertheless found Munyakazi guilty of “committing” genocide and the crime against
humanity of extermination under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute. As an initial
matter, the Chamber recalled the ICTR
Appeals Chamber’s holding in the Seromba
case that, “in the context of genocide . . .
‘direct and physical perpetration’ need
not mean physical killing; other acts can
constitute direct participation in the actus
reus of the crime.” The question, according
to the Seromba Chamber, is whether the
actions of the accused “were as much an
integral part of the genocide as were the
killings which they enabled.” Applying this
standard to the case, the Trial Chamber first
determined that, although Munyakazi did
not hold any official post within the local
branch of the MRND, he exercised de facto
control over the Bugarama Interahamwe
and was the leader of the group’s attacks on
Shangi parish and Mibilizi parish. Indeed,
witnesses from Shangi and Mibilizi parishes testified that Munyakazi was the one
giving orders to the Interahamwe, and witnesses who saw him with other members of
the Interahamwe testified that those people
behaved as if Munyakazi was their leader.
Thus, although the Prosecution was unable
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Munyakazi was the single de jure leader of
the Bugarama Interahamwe, the Chamber
was convinced that he was a leader, and
one who exercised significant de facto
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control over the group in relation to the
relevant attacks.

housing, food, transportation, weapons and
military training.

On the basis of leadership, the Chamber
concluded that Munyakazi “was as much
an integral part of the killings as those he
enabled, and that he approved and embraced
the decision to commit the crimes as his
own.” Furthermore, the Chamber found that
both Shangi parish and Mibilizi parish were
attacked with the purpose of eliminating all
the Tutsi refugees who had sought shelter
there. The Chamber found that it was not
clear from the evidence presented whether
Munyakazi himself had personal animosity
towards the Tutsi people, or if he was simply
trying to gain favor with the MRND leadership. The court determined that he had
nevertheless demonstrated a specific intent
to destroy the Tutsi in Shangi and Mibilizi
parishes, as required for the charge of genocide. Furthermore, the Chamber found that
Munyakazi knew his actions were part of a
“widespread and systematic attack” against
the Tutsi people, and therefore also found
him guilty of committing extermination as a
crime against humanity.

In sentencing Munyakazi, the Chamber
noted that the penalty imposed should
“reflect the goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the protection
of society.” Furthermore, the Chamber
stated that, pursuant to Article 23 of the
ICTR Statute, it would consider the general practice regarding prison sentences
in Rwanda, the gravity of the offenses,
and the individual circumstances of the
accused, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances. For the gravity of
the offense, the Chamber stressed that the
attacks on Shangi and Mibilizi parishes
resulted in a substantial number of deaths
and a great deal of human suffering. It also
recognized that “commission” is a direct
form of participation in the crime. Noting
that under Rwandan law, similar crimes
may be punished by life imprisonment, the
Chamber explained that, in the practice of
the ICTR, such sentences were “reserved
for those who planned or ordered atrocities
as well as the most senior authorities.” The
only aggravating factor considered by the
Chamber was Munyakazi’s abuse of his
superior position, while his advanced age
was the only mitigating factor to which the
Chamber gave weight. The Defense also
pointed to the fact that Munyakazi had
provided assistance to a select number of
Tutsi friends during the genocide, but the
Chamber held that it was in its discretion
to disregard such “selective assistance” to
Tutsis. In the end, the sentence of twentyfive years was imposed as a single sentence for each of the crimes for which
Munyakazi was convicted.

In addition to the attacks on Shangi
and Mibilizi parishes, Munyakazi was
charged with responsibility for an attack
on Nyamasheke parish that occurred on
April 16, 1994. Although Prosecution witnesses testified that Munyakazi was the
first of the Interahamwe to enter the church
and that he appeared to be giving orders,
accomplice witnesses for the defense testified that on April 16, 1994, they were
with the Bugarama Interahamwe at the
CIMERWA cement factory. CIMERWA,
which is close to Bugarama, is quite far
from Nyamasheke parish, so it would not
have been possible for both attacks to
occur in a single day. Additionally, three
defense witnesses living nearby testified
that Nyamasheke parish was attacked several times over a period of days, but not
on April 16. The Chamber concluded that
the reports of multiple attacks, combined
with the distance between CIMERWA
and Nyamasheke parish, left a reasonable doubt as to whether Munyakazi participated in an attack in Nyamasheke on
April 16, 1994. The Chamber also found
that there was insufficient evidence to
support the Prosecution’s allegation that
Munyakazi participated in a joint criminal
enterprise aimed at destroying the Tutsi
population, in whole or in part, by providing the Bugarama Interahamwe with

Beka Feathers, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the
War Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Dominique
Ntawukulilyayo, Trial Judgment,
Case No. ICTR-05-82-T
On August 3, 2010, Trial Chamber III
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) issued a judgment in the
case against Dominique Ntawukulilyayo,
former sub-prefect of Gisagara sub-prefecture in Butare. Ntawukulilyayo was found
guilty of genocide under Article 2 of the
49

ICTR Statute and not guilty of complicity
in genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.
In its indictment, the Prosecution
alleged that Ntawukulilyayo was responsible for genocide or, in the alternative, complicity in genocide, based on his alleged
role in events that occurred between April
20 and 25, 1994, at Gisagara market and
Kabuye hill. The evidence established that
on April 20, 1994, thousands of Tutsis
fleeing attacks from Hutus sought refuge
at Gisagara market. The following day,
several of the displaced persons tried to
depart the market for Burundi, but law
enforcement personnel prevented them
from leaving. From April 21 through April
23, many of the refugees at Gisagara market were ordered to leave the market and
go to Kabuye hill where, beginning on
April 23, armed civilians, police, and military personnel killed or seriously injured
up to 25,000 primarily Tutsi refugees.
The Defense did not deny that the events
occurred, but claimed that Ntawukulilyayo
had no role in relation to the events.
According to the Defense, Ntawukulilyayo
was never present at Kabuye hill and he
only visited the market to inquire about
the welfare of the refugees and inform
them of his efforts to obtain assistance.
By contrast, the Prosecution argued that
Ntawukulilyayo bore responsibility for
genocide or complicity in genocide based
on his role in convincing Tutsis to go to
Kabuye hill and his role in the subsequent
attack on Tutsis at the hill. The charge of
direct and public incitement to genocide
was based on two separate counts. The
first involved a public address delivered
by Ntawukulilyayo on April 24 in which
he allegedly promised houses, land, and
money to those who killed the most Tutsis.
The second count was based on allegations
that Ntawukulilyayo had urged a crowd
of people gathered in front of the deputy
bourgmestre’s house in late May 1994 to
search for and kill Tutsis before the arrival
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
With regard to the events at Gisagara
market and Kabuye hill, the Trial Chamber
found insufficient evidence to support the
allegations that Ntawukulilyayo ordered the
interception of Tutsis seeking to flee to
Burundi on April 20 and that he had a role
in convincing Tutsis to leave the market
for the hill on April 21 and 22. However,
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a majority of the Trial Chamber found that
Ntawukulilyayo came to Gisagara market
on April 23 and told the refugees that they
would be fed and protected at Kabuye
hill, convincing many refugees to leave the
market for the hill. In addition, a majority of the Chamber found that, on April
23, Ntawukulilyayo transported soldiers
to Kabuye hill who subsequently attacked
the Tutsi refugees. Ntawukulilyayo did not
return and the assault continued through the
following day, eventually including civilian assailants. Based on these facts, the
majority of the Chamber determined that
Ntawukulilyayo was responsible for aiding and abetting the killing of Tutsi civilians by instructing the refugees at Gisagara
market to move to Kabuye hill and by
transporting soldiers who participated in
the attack. Although no witness testified
to having expressly heard Ntawukulilyayo
give instructions to the soldiers he brought
to Kabuye hill, the majority found he was
liable for ordering the killing of Tutsis
based on a finding that “his prominent role
in removing Tutsis from Gisagara market to Kabuye hill and his direct involvement in transporting assailants to there”
led to the conclusion that he ordered those
he transported to kill the Tutsi refugees.
Furthermore, due to the systematic and
extensive nature of the attack, the majority
was certain that the purpose of the attack
was to eliminate the majority of Tutsi refugees gathered on Kabuye hill. Finally, the
majority found that Ntawukulilyayo had
knowledge of the genocidal intent of the
Kabuye hill assailants and that he shared
in such intent. While the Prosecution also
alleged that Ntawukulilyayo was guilty of
genocide under a theory of superior responsibility pursuant to Article 6(3) of the ICTR
Statute, the Chamber found insufficient
evidence demonstrating that, as sub-prefect,
Ntawukulilyayo had the material ability to
prevent the commission of offenses by communal police, soldiers, and civilian assailants or to punish those who committed
offenses. Having convicted Ntawukulilyayo
of genocide, the alternative of complicity in
genocide was dismissed.
Judge Akay dissented from the majority regarding Ntawukulilyayo’s conviction
of genocide. While he found the evidence
of events at Gisagara and Kabuye hill to be
generally sound, the inconsistencies within
witness testimonies raised doubts regarding Ntawukulilyayo’s involvement in the
events. According to the Akay, the specific

accounts of Ntawukulilyayo’s whereabouts
were far too inconsistent. He also found the
Defense’s evidence that market traders and
residents were responsible for instigating
the flight of the refugees from the market
because of deteriorating hygiene conditions credible. Furthermore, he stressed
that witness statements about the timing
of Ntawukulilyayo’s arrival at Kabuye hill
along with the type of vehicle he arrived
in varied. Judge Akay acknowledged that
the tense situation may have distorted the
witnesses’ views, but he also found that the
statements did not corroborate each other
sufficiently to support a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt.
For the charge of direct and public
incitement to genocide, the Chamber
found that the evidence presented by the
Prosecution insufficiently supported the
allegations in the indictment regarding
Ntawukulilyayo’s April 24 promise of
housing, land, and money to those who
killed Tutsis. The Chamber also was not
convinced by the evidence in support of
the allegation that Ntawukulilyayo urged
a crowd of people to kill Tutsis before the
arrival of the RPF in late May. Accordingly,
the Chamber unanimously dismissed the
incitement charge.
Finally, for purposes of sentencing,
the Chamber considered the gravity of
the offense for which Ntawukulilyayo
was convicted, as well as aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances included the fact that he had
abused his position of authority in convincing the Tutsi refugees to move from the
market to the hill, as well as the number of
victims. Mitigating circumstances included
Ntawukulilyayo’s age, relative health, and
past actions. At the time of sentencing,
Ntawukulilyayo was seventy years old and
suffering from Diabetes. The Chamber
further noted that prior to the 1994 genocide, Ntawukulilyayo devoted part of his
professional career to easing ethnic tensions in Rwanda and that the evidence
suggested his participation in killings may
have resulted from trying to demonstrate
his loyalty to the government rather than
from any ethnic hatred.
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the
War Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.
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International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
ICTY Appeals Chamber Rules Trial
Chamber Failed to Address Witness
Intimidation in Haradinaj et al
On July 21, 2010, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with
President Robinson dissenting, granted the
prosecution’s appeal for a partial retrial
in the case of Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz
Balaj, and Lahi Brahima. The retrial is
based, in part, on charges relating to allegations of prisoner abuse at a Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) detention facility
in Jablanica. In the first instance, Trial
Chamber I found the evidence before it
was insufficient and acquitted all three of
the accused of operating a joint criminal
enterprise.
The Appeals Chamber ruled that Trial
Chamber I erred by constraining the prosecution to pre-determined time limits to
present its case despite allegations of witness intimidation; by failing to properly
respond to specific requests by the prosecution; and by failing to act proprio motu to
facilitate witness testimony. Furthermore,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that Trial
Chamber I’s presumptions in the interest of
efficiency compromised the fairness of the
proceedings in light of witness intimidation. The conflicting rulings by the Trial
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in
Haradinaj et al highlight the inherent challenges of compelling unwilling witnesses
to testify.
The Appeals Chamber based its decision on the Trial Chamber’s failure to facilitate the testimony of two unwilling witnesses who were present at the Jablanaca
camp: Shefqet Kabashi, a former KLA
prison camp guard and a protected witness who was imprisoned at the camp. The
prosecution asserted that these witnesses
possessed direct evidence as to the guilt
of the accused, but the witnesses refused
to testify out of fear and intimidation.
Kabashi claims that he had received threats
in previous cases at the ICTY where other
protected witnesses had been killed. In lieu
of an indictment, Trial Chamber I issued an
order against Kabashi for contempt under
Rule of Procedure and Evidence 77 when
he refused to answer questions in court and
then refused to testify via video conference
after fleeing to the United States. Under
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Rule 77, Trial Chamber I could direct the
prosecution to investigate the matter, initiate procedures itself, or have the registrar
appoint an amicus curiae to investigate.
In addition, Trial Chamber I, in opposition to the prosecution’s requests, held the
prosecution to its previously allotted time
in presenting its case. The prosecution is
likely to seek testimony from Kabashi and
the former KLA prisoner in the retrial to
support joint criminal enterprise charges.
The Appeals Chamber based its ruling in Haradinaj et al on what it regarded
as an improper balance struck by the
Trial Chamber, between addressing witness intimidation and maintaining trial
expediency. Given the importance of the
witnesses’ testimonies to the prosecution’s
case, the Appeals Chamber held that the
Trial Chamber’s decision “undermined the
fairness of the proceedings . . . and resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.” It would be a
gross oversimplification to say the takeaway from the Appeals Chamber’s ruling is that fairness considerations trump
efficiency concerns. However, witness
intimidation complicates ICTY procedure
and, in addition to adjudicating cases,
Trial Chambers are ultimately responsible
for protecting witnesses. In cases involving witness intimidation, the Appeals
Chambers’ ruling establishes that the Trial
Chambers must be particularly cautious
when implementing time constraints to
avoid sacrificing fairness in the interest of
efficiency.

ICTY Appeals Chamber Grants
First-Ever Review Judgment in
Šljivančanin Case
On December 8, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
vacated the May 2009 Appeals Chamber
Judgment of Veselin Šljivančanin. The
groundbreaking decision overturned
Šljivančanin’s conviction for conspiracy to
commit murder in light of new testimony
undermining the mens rea element of that
charge. In a split decision, the Appeals
Chamber issued its first review judgment
with two judges writing separately and one
partially dissenting. Šljivančanin, a former
lieutenant colonel in the Yugoslav Peoples’
Army (JNA), was originally sentenced by
Trial Chamber III in September 2007 to
five years imprisonment for aiding and
abetting the torture of prisoners during the
1991 Vukovar massacre. In May 2009, the

Appeals Chamber affirmed Šljivančanin’s
first conviction and convicted him on an
additional charge of aiding and abetting the
murder of 194 prisoners during the same
incident. Holding that Šljivančanin’s fiveyear sentence did not sufficiently reflect
the gravity of his first conviction and
accounting for the new conviction, the
Appeals Chamber sentenced Šljivančanin
to 17 years’ imprisonment. At the beginning of 2010, Šljivančanin applied for
review of the additional conviction of aiding and abetting murder, which resulted
in the December 2010 vacation of the
Appeals Chamber’s May 2009 judgment.

Judge Pocar argued that the Appeals
Chamber does not have the authority to
issue a higher sentence than that of the
Trial Chamber. Judge Pocar, who has made
the similar arguments in other dissenting
opinions, views the increased sentence
under the Appeals Chamber’s decision as
infringing on the generally accepted right
of appeal under human rights law. He also
argued that the Appeal Chambers erred
in its application of procedure by holding
a preliminary hearing to determine the
“evidentiary value” of the submitted “new
fact” prior to determining whether it could
constitute a “new fact.”

In considering the defense motion, the
Appeals Chamber applied the two-step
procedure for evaluating requests under
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)
Part Eight. The first stage involved a preliminary hearing in which the defense had
the burden of showing that a “new fact,”
“which was not known to the moving party
at the time of the proceedings before . . .
the Appeals Chamber, and could not have
been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence” had emerged that would have
altered the Appeal Chamber’s decision.
Having satisfied the first step, the Appeals
Chamber then considered the weight of the
new evidence and issued its ruling reversing Šljivančanin’s prior sentence in order to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Despite the split decision and Judge
Pocar’s concerns regarding sentencing
and procedural issues, the Šljivančanin
review judgment demonstrates that the
ICTY is willing to question its own rulings. Although one decision is not enough
to indicate a complete change of direction
in the ICTY’s use of the review request
process, that the Appeals Chamber granted
the first successful request for a review
judgment after sixteen years of the procedure being functionally dormant is a
significant development in international
criminal jurisprudence.

The RPE designates the chamber from
which the judgment in question took place
to be the chamber that evaluates judgment review requests. One criticism of this
process is that it results in a system where
chambers, by virtue of having the discretion to decide what constitutes “new evidence,” could dismiss meritorious requests
because the requests conflict with prior rulings. Prior to the success of Šljivančanin’s
request for review judgment, all thirteen
previous attempts for review judgment at
the ICTY were dismissed at the first stage
of RPE Part Eight’s process for failure
to demonstrate new facts. Instead, the
chambers ruled that these were “additional
fact(s)” not meeting the standard of review
because they were known at the time of the
proceedings.

A leaked 2009 U.S. Department of
State (DOS) cable from Zagreb, Croatia
reveals U.S. support for Croatia’s EU bid
despite substantial opposition. The cable,
sent on November 30, 2009, and provided
to The Guardian by Wikileaks, reveals
diplomatic efforts to persuade the UK to
change its stance on Croatia’s accession
despite International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor
Serge Brammertz’s critical assessments of
Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. While
it has been public knowledge that Croatia’s
EU bid was contingent on cooperation with
the ICTY and that the process was held
up by the UK and the Netherlands, the
Wikileaks cable reveals the complexity of
the international political system that the
ICTY occupies.

In his partially dissenting opinion,
Judge Pocar agreed with the reversal of
the aiding and abetting murder charge but
disagreed with the majority’s decision to
impose a ten-year sentence on Šljivančanin
rather than the initial five-year sentence.

Finding that, “the impasse could undermine the U.S. stake both in the [Prime
Minister of Croatia Jadranka] Kosor-led
reform process in Croatia and the region’s
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions [,]” the DOS’ Zagreb office recom-
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2009 Wikileaks Cable Reveals
U.S. Support of Croatia’s EU Bid
Despite ICTY Opposition
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mended contesting Brammertz’s findings
at a UN Security Council discussion on the
ICTY. The Zagreb office also suggested
“consider[ing] high-level approaches to
the UK and Netherlands . . . urging that
the EU make Croatia’s ICTY cooperation
a closing rather than an opening benchmark for Chapter 23 accession negotiations.” The leaked cable shows that French
Ambassador Jérôme Pasquier thought
France would also be willing to dissent
from Brammetz’s conclusion. At the time
the Cable was sent, cooperation with the
ICTY was a barrier to opening Chapter 23
negotiations – the body of EU treaty law
that relates to judiciary and fundamental
rights. Accession to the EU is contingent
upon the applicant state demonstrating its
compliance with Chapter 23. Therefore,
Croatia must demonstrate that it has an
independent and efficient judiciary, legal

guarantees for fair trial procedures, and
policies effectively addressing and deterring corruption.
The cable identified Croatia’s failure to
provide documents relating to the ICTY’s
Gotovina et al. case and artillery documents relating to Operation Storm as a
key point of contention between the U.S.
assessment of Croatia’s cooperation and
Brammertz’s assessment. A specially-created Croatian task force reported that, out
of twenty-three documents sought, it had
delivered three full documents and one partial draft of a document to the ICTY, four
were never created, seven were destroyed,
and eight had not yet been found. While
U.S. Ambassador Stephen Rapp was satisfied with the task force’s work on addressing ICTY concerns, the cable reported
that Brammertz “remain[ed] unwilling to
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acknowledge the full degree of Croatia’s
cooperation.” The cable predicted that,
“Croatia could be facing a prolonged and
indefinite blockage of its EU accession.”
The cable shows that the U.S. diplomatically lobbied for Croatia, was prepared
to challenge the ICTY’s determinations
and that the U.S. had interests to protect
in Croatia’s government under President
Kosar. U.S. consultations with France and
appeals to the UK on altering the EU’s
stance on Croatia’s compliance with the
ICTY provide rare insight into the politics
of cooperation with the ICTY and their
impact on accession into the EU.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for
the Human Rights Brief. HRB

